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Anti-black prejudice in Asian American public opinion¹

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ABSTRACT

Despite the growing size and political relevance of the Asian American population, existing research provides limited insight into how anti-Black prejudice shapes Asian American public opinion. Using four Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys (CCES) and additional tests using two National Asian American Surveys (NAAS), I show four key findings. First, US-born Asians exhibit lower levels of anti-Black prejudice than foreign-born Asians even after accounting for the effects of other plausible influences. Furthermore, both groups are more racially sympathetic than whites. Second, US-born Asians' racial attitudes liberalized at a faster rate than foreign-born Asians' after 2016, in line with trends found in existing research on white Democrats. Third, despite having lower overall levels of anti-Black animus, US-born Asians' racial sentiments are more strongly correlated with a variety of political attitudes than the racial sentiments of their foreign-born counterparts. Fourth, this racialization of political attitudes for US-born Asians appears to be the result of racially liberal US-born Asians being especially likely to hold liberal political views.

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Considering the importance of race to the history and contemporary politics of the United States, it is not surprising that the political influence of racial prejudice has received significant attention in political science research. A large body of findings has shown that anti-Black prejudice is a central determinant of whites' opposition to a host of explicitly and implicitly racial policies and African American candidates (Gilens 1999; Hutchings 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tesler and Sears 2010).

While studies have long focused on the role of racial animosity in shaping public opinion, existing research focuses mostly on what white Americans think about African Americans. A few studies have examined anti-Black prejudice among Latinos (Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Segura and Valenzuela 2010), but very little is known about the contours and political significance of Asian American prejudice. This is a critical omission for at least three reasons. First, Asian American political power is on the rise. Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial or ethnic group in the United States, increasing 72% from 11.9 million in 2000 to 20.4 million in 2015 compared to a 60% Latino growth rate over the same period (López, Ruiz, and Patten 2017). The Asian American share of the US

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population is projected to increase from about 6% today to 14% by 2065, surpassing African Americans as the nation's third-largest racial/ethnic group after whites and Latinos (Cohn 2015). Second, anti-Black prejudice among Asian Americans (and intergroup prejudice between racial minority groups more generally) is likely to be an increasingly significant force in American politics. As demographers expect racial minorities to surpass whites as a majority of the US population sometime in the 2040s (Craig and Richeson 2014), some optimistically forecast that this "diversity explosion" will result in a more pluralistic America (Frey 2015). However, hopeful predictions overlook the potential for conflict among minority groups as they jostle for political, economic, and cultural influence in a remade American landscape. Glimpses into that future are already visible, particularly in American cities like New York over issues like admission to the city's specialized public high schools or admission into prestigious universities such as Harvard. In both cases, some Asian Americans protested admission policies that they believe favor African American and Latino students at the expense of Asian American students (Eligon 2018). Finally, Asian American anti-Black prejudice matters for the future balance of power in American politics. Although Asian Americans currently vote for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections by about a 2-to-1 margin, their ties to the Democratic Party (or party politics in general) are tenuous as most Asian Americans indicate no partisan preference when asked on national surveys (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Ramakrishnan et al. 2018). Given that the organization of partisan politics around racial issues dates back to at least the civil rights era and shows signs of growing even stronger in the current era, Asian Americans' attitudes toward Blacks will likely reveal important clues about their current and future political leanings (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Enders and Scott 2019; Tesler 2016). Lower levels of racial animus point to the possibility that Asian Americans will find a home on the political left with racially liberal whites and other people of color. On the other hand, higher levels of racial animus suggest that Asian Americans could align themselves politically with racially resentful whites.

In this paper, I develop a theory of Asian American racial socialization and test its predictions with six surveys from 2008 to 2018 that include large numbers of Asian American respondents. Building on findings in sociology and political science that suggest greater diversity in the peer groups of US-born Asian Americans compared to foreign-born Asian Americans, I theorize that this difference in peer group composition is likely to influence Asian Americans' attitudes toward African Americans. Specifically, I expect US-born Asian Americans' greater social contact with liberal whites and other people of color to result in more liberal views on the status of African Americans. I find support for this hypothesis as well as differences in the influence of anti-Black sentiment on subsequent political judgments. While US-born Asians exhibit lower levels of anti-Black sentiment than foreign-born Asians, anti-Black sentiment is a stronger predictor of US-born Asians' political views. This suggests that anti-Black animus will continue to shape American public opinion even as demographic forecasts show the US becoming a majority-minority nation by the 2040s.

Previous literature

Much of what is known about Asian American anti-Black prejudice is derived from the media coverage of conflict between Asian American and African American communities.

For example, tension between African American and Korean communities in Los Angeles and New York in the 1990s attracted widespread attention (Kim 2000).¹ Inter-group conflict continues today as demonstrated by incidents such as the 2016 conviction of a Chinese American New York City police officer for the shooting of an unarmed Black man and a 2018 brawl between Asian American workers and Black customers in a Brooklyn nail salon and the protests that followed (Leland, Alfaro, and Robertson 2018; Rojas 2016). Coverage of these events typically focuses on the views of Asian American community organizations, protesters, and citizens. While such coverage is illuminating, its key limitation is that the representativeness of the views expressed by these elite actors and “persons in the street” is unknown.

The growth of survey data on Asian Americans over the last two decades offers the potential to overcome this limitation. Research based on reliable opinion data has shed light on the acquisition of partisanship (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2016; Raychaudhuri 2018) and the determinants of political participation for Asian Americans (Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong et al. 2011). The racial attitudes of Asian Americans, however, have attracted less attention from survey researchers. In one of the earliest systematic studies of Asian American racial attitudes, Lee (2000) found that Asian Americans preferred whites over Blacks as marriage partners, friends, and neighbors, but the political significance of these racial considerations was not examined. Ramakrishnan et al. (2009) used data from the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) to determine whether race-based considerations predicted Asian American opposition to Barack Obama in the primary and general elections of 2008. However, the NAAS did not include what is widely considered to be the focal construct for measuring anti-Black prejudice: the racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Instead, Ramakrishnan et al. (2009, 225) measured anti-Black sentiment based on Asian Americans’ perceived political commonality with Blacks, a move that the authors admit “does not allow us to test specifically for the influence of anti-Black prejudice, per se, on Asian American vote choice.” This paper addresses this gap in the literature by bringing racial resentment into the study of Asian American public opinion and voting behavior.

Theoretical expectations

To understand Asian American anti-Black prejudice, it is useful to draw upon foundational studies of modern racial prejudice among white Americans. The civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s eventually brought about the end of formal discrimination and the beginning of the widespread acceptance of the idea that Blacks are not inherently inferior to whites (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). In spite of these impressive achievements, however, vast racial inequality persisted. Following the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, a conservative movement arose in opposition to further attempts to advance the cause of racial equality (Edsall and Edsall 1991). By the 1970s, researchers noticed a gap between growing white support for racial equality in principle, but significant white opposition to government efforts to address racial inequality. New research, seeking to explain this principle-policy paradox, centered on the concept of racial resentment, which held that the old-fashioned racism of the Jim Crow era had given way to a new form of racism that attributes racial inequality not to the biological

inferiority of Blacks, but to the refusal of Blacks to work hard and practice self-discipline (Kinder and Sanders 1996).² Racial resentment and the related concept of “symbolic racism” (Kinder and Sears 1981) arose from theories of symbolic politics (Edelman 1964; Sears 1993), which emphasized the role of early childhood socialization in the development of core political predispositions such as racial prejudice. According to symbolic racism theory, the information environment of many young whites communicates negative feelings about Blacks, which, combined with a belief in traditional American values such as individualism, influences political decision-making later in life (Sears 1988).

Bringing our focus back to Asian Americans, the key question becomes, what is the information environment of young Asian Americans with respect to Blacks? One factor that is likely to influence the socialization experiences of Asian Americans is nativity (i.e., being born in the US versus abroad), particularly the experience of being educated in American schools. Research has long shown that formal education is the strongest predictor of tolerance of minority groups (e.g., Converse 1972) and that American schools and universities are important sites where norms of tolerance are conveyed and internalized (Newcomb 1943; Pascarella and Terenzini 1991; Sidanius et al. 2008). By being socialized in these institutions, US-born Asians may be more likely to grow up in a social milieu that promotes less animus toward Blacks than the environment experienced by their foreign-born counterparts.³ There are, of course, other possible influences on anti-Black animus, such as the Asian ethnic group to which one belongs, one’s partisanship, or one’s social class. The first hypothesis tests whether the difference in anti-Black attitudes between US-born and foreign-born Asian Americans holds up even after accounting for these alternative explanations.

The extent of racial resentment among US-born and foreign-born Asian Americans raises the question of how they compare to other racial groups, particularly whites. Whites are an appropriate benchmark because their prejudice has historically been the most politically consequential and perhaps, therefore, the most carefully examined and well understood (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Starting with its magnitude, will US- and foreign-born Asian Americans exhibit as much racial resentment as whites? There is a reason to believe they might. Through the media, whites and US-born Asians are exposed to the same negative depictions of African Americans (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999). Although foreign-born Asians are not socialized in the same environment, many come from societies that have their own strong notions of racial hierarchy (e.g., Dikötter 2015; Wyatt 2009). On the other hand, it is possible that anti-Black sentiment is tempered by Asian Americans’ own experiences with discrimination and prejudice (Takaki 1993). Such experiences may heighten their awareness of racism in America and lead to a more racially sympathetic outlook than that of whites. The second hypothesis adjudicates between these two possibilities.

In addition to current levels of racial resentment, I also examine its variation over time. Recent work examining trends in white racial attitudes finds that 2016 marked a turning point, with white attitudes shifting in a liberal direction after decades of stability (Englehardt 2019; Pew 2017).⁴ These findings raise the question of whether Asian Americans experienced a similar liberal shift. One important clue is the subgroup of white Americans that is driving the liberalizing trend: white Democrats. A consistent finding

across several different measures of racial attitudes is that white Democrats shifted in a liberal direction around 2016, while white Republicans moved little if at all (Edsall 2019; Englehardt 2019; McElwee 2018; Pew 2017). With that in mind, a social theory of Asian American racial socialization suggests that Asian Americans, who are more likely to socialize with or otherwise be exposed to the ideas circulating among liberal whites, are more likely to adopt liberal views on race after 2016 than Asian Americans who have less contact with liberal whites. Here, again, nativity is likely to serve as a proxy for contact with liberal whites. Sociological studies of second-generation Asian Americans suggest that their social circles are more diverse than their parents' due to exposure to non-Asians in school (Kiang 2001; Zhou and Xiong 2005), with universities often serving as a key conveyor of messages of tolerance and the benefits of multiculturalism (Sidanius et al. 2008). Similarly, Raychaudhuri (2018) finds that peer groups vary in composition between first- and second-generation Asian Americans and the second-generation's interactions with diverse peers are critical to the development of Democratic partisanship. If social transmission of political predispositions applies to racial attitudes as it does to partisanship, as symbolic politics theory suggests, a third hypothesis emerges: we expect US-born Asians to exhibit a stronger liberal shift in their attitudes toward Blacks after 2016 than foreign-born Asians.

Finally, I turn to the political significance of anti-Black attitudes for Asian American public opinion. There are two reasons why we would expect racial animus to be a stronger predictor of the political attitudes of US-born Asians than foreign-born Asians. First, US-born Asians may have a better grasp of the implications of their racial attitudes for their broader political views due to the greater integration into non-immigrant social networks and information environments that comes from being born and socialized in the United States. This integration promotes familiarity with American political culture, which is currently characterized by a strong and growing link between whites' racial attitudes and a variety of political predispositions such as partisanship, ideology, vote choice, and policy opinions (Enders and Scott 2019; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tesler 2012; Tesler 2016). The extent to which Asian Americans also reflect these trends is likely to be determined by how attuned they are to the forces in the political environment that have racialized white public opinion. If US-born Asians with racially liberal leanings are better able to connect their racial attitudes with liberal positions on other political attitudes and US-born Asians with racially conservative leanings are better able to connect conservative racial attitudes with conservative political positions, then we would expect to see a stronger association between racial attitudes and political views among the US-born than the foreign-born. Second, if US-born Asians are, on average, socialized in a less overtly anti-Black environment due to socialization in American schools and greater interaction with diverse peers, then the expression of racial prejudice may be a particularly informative signal about how they feel about politics more broadly. In other words, since it might be more costly for a US-born Asian to signal prejudice given their environment, the political significance of their prejudice may be stronger. DeSante and Smith's (2020) examination of the racial attitudes of white millennials compared to older whites finds evidence of a similar dynamic in which white millennials express less prejudice on average, but prejudice among millennials is more strongly associated with old-fashioned racism and other political attitudes than it is for older whites. We do not seek to adjudicate between these two explanations, but instead to offer them as a basis for a prediction

regarding the fourth hypothesis: that the racial attitudes of US-born Asians are more tightly connected to their broader political outlook than those of foreign-born Asians. For the reasons mentioned, we expect this to be the case.

Data and methods

Data sets

This study relies primarily on data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).⁵ This internet-based survey is ideal for testing the hypotheses outlined earlier because it meets three conditions. First, it contains the racial resentment battery, the widely used and empirically validated measure of anti-Black prejudice that is not included in nationally representative surveys of Asian Americans like the NAAS (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2005; Tarman and Sears 2005). Since the racial resentment battery was first included in the 2010 CCES and in every subsequent presidential or midterm election year excluding 2016, the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018 surveys are used. Second, the CCES has large samples of Asian Americans unlike the American National Election Study (ANES). The number of Asian American respondents ranges from 617 in 2010 to 1742 in 2018. Third, the CCES has an extensive set of questions about a host of predispositions, behaviors, and attitudes that I can test for associations with racial resentment. One limitation of the CCES is that all interviews are conducted in English, which means that it is not a nationally representative sample of Asian Americans. However, the CCES samples still contain notable variance across key sociodemographic variables and political attitudes such as ethnicity, region, immigration status, nativity, religion, and partisanship. A comparison of the CCES Asian American samples and the Asian American adult population as measured in the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) is included in Table 2 of the Appendix.⁶

Although the NAAS does not include the racial resentment battery as part of its data collection, it has the advantage of being a large ($n = 5159$ in 2008 and $n = 4362$ in 2016) nationally representative survey of Asian Americans conducted in eight languages in 2008 and 12 languages in 2016. Although they do not contain the racial resentment battery, the 2008 and 2016 post-election NAAS include a question about perceived political commonality with African Americans that was used as a proxy for racial resentment in earlier research (Ramakrishnan et al. 2009): “Thinking about government services, political power, and representation, would you say Asian Americans have a lot in common, some, little in common, or nothing at all in common with African Americans?”⁷ Using this question as an alternative measure of anti-Black affect, additional tests are conducted using the 2008 NAAS and 2016 post-election NAAS.

Models

The first hypothesis tests whether anti-Black attitudes (as measured by the racial resentment scale in the CCES or the “distance from Blacks” measure in the NAAS) differ between US- and foreign-born Asian Americans, controlling for other plausible influences on anti-Black attitudes such as ethnic group, partisanship, income, education, age, gender, and Southern residence. The second hypothesis tests whether US-born

and foreign-born Asians exhibit lower levels of racial resentment than whites. This is determined by a simple comparison of means test. The third hypothesis tests whether US-born Asians' racial attitudes shift more strongly in a liberal direction over time than the racial attitudes of foreign-born Asians. This is tested by estimating anti-Black attitudes as a function of US birth, time, and the interaction between US birth and time, with a statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction term indicating support for the hypothesis. Finally, the fourth hypothesis tests whether the association between political attitudes and anti-Black attitudes is stronger among US-born Asians compared to foreign-born Asians. The dependent variables in this analysis are preferences on a variety of political questions. The predictors are anti-Black attitudes, US birth, the interaction between the two, and relevant control variables, with statistically significant positive coefficients on the interaction term counting as evidence in favor of the hypothesis.

The measurement of racial resentment and the outcome measures used to test the fourth hypothesis requires closer examination. I take up each in the sections that follow.

The measurement of racial resentment and its meaning for Asian Americans

The primary measure of anti-Black prejudice in this study is the racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996). This measure was designed to tap "symbolic racism," a concept developed to distinguish between white Americans, who attribute racial inequality primarily to structural causes like discrimination from those who instead point to cultural deficiencies such as the rejection of self-reliance and hard work. The racial resentment battery asks respondents to agree or disagree with statements, such as "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors," and "Generations of slavery and discrimination make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."⁸ The full racial resentment battery contains four items. All four items are included on the 2018 CCES, while the 2010, 2012, and 2014 CCES contain two: the "Blacks should work their way up" and "slavery and discrimination" items. Responses to the items are summed and then divided by the number of questions (two or four depending on the year) to generate an overall racial resentment score that ranges from the most racially sympathetic score of 0 to the most racially resentful score of 1.

The racial resentment scale was originally designed to measure white resentment of African Americans, which raises the question of whether it is a meaningful construct for measuring anti-Black sentiment among non-white groups. Kam and Burge (2019) find that the racial resentment scale has similar correlates and performs consistently in tests of predictive validity among both African American and white respondents. While this suggests that racial resentment can be fruitfully used to examine the opinions of non-whites, no study to date provides a similar validation for Asian Americans.

I briefly assess the validity of the racial resentment scale for Asian Americans in two ways. First, I consider whether the scale captures the construct that we expect it to embody, which is Asian Americans' views about African Americans. If Asian Americans answer the racial resentment questions in ways that have little to do with their views about African Americans, then we would expect low correlations between answers to each pair of questions. The correlation between the two items used from 2010 to 2014

was 0.40 for Asians and 0.65 for whites, while the average correlation between the four items on the 2018 CCES was 0.61 for Asians compared to 0.73 for whites.⁹ Although the correlations are weaker for Asians, they are still sizable. Furthermore, the Cronbach's alpha for the 2010–2014 two-item scale is 0.57 for Asians and 0.78 for whites, with more similar Cronbach's alpha levels for the 2018 four-item scale of 0.86 for Asians and 0.92 for whites. This lends further support to the notion that responses to the racial resentment questions reflect a coherent Asian American outlook, though they hang together somewhat less well than they do for whites. Finally, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the four-item 2018 racial resentment battery shows that factor loadings on racial resentment treated as a latent construct are high for both groups on all four items.¹⁰ Thus, although racial resentment appears to be a more crystallized belief system for whites, it still appears to measure a coherent, internally consistent, and similarly interpreted set of beliefs for Asian Americans.

The second part of validity that I examine is whether racial resentment is associated with, but distinct from, related predispositions such as partisanship and ideology. To examine this, I calculated the correlations between racial resentment and these two key predispositions. Starting with partisanship, the correlation between Republican partisanship and racial resentment score using the two-item scale from 2010 to 2014 was 0.37 for Asians and 0.54 for whites, while the same correlation using the four-item scale in 2018 was 0.48 for Asians and 0.64 for whites. As expected, racial resentment is correlated with Republican partisanship for Asians, but not overwhelmingly so and not as strongly as it is for whites. Similarly, for ideology, the 2010–2014 correlation between conservative ideology and racial resentment was 0.37 for Asians and 0.59 for whites, while the 2018 correlation was 0.53 for Asians and 0.67 for whites. In sum, these validation exercises suggest that racial resentment travels well when applied to Asian Americans. Just as it does for whites, it measures a coherent belief system about African Americans that is distinct from other politically relevant predispositions.

Outcome measures

The outcome measures are questions on a range of political attitudes, orientations, and choices from the 2018 CCES with additional questions from the 2016 post-election NAAS. I divide the outcome measures into four categories. The first category is questions about racialized policy preferences. These policies may or may not explicitly mention race, but are widely understood in racial terms. The criterion used by existing research to determine whether a policy is understood in racial terms is whether racial attitudes predict policy opinion after accounting for the influence of non-racial factors (Filindra and Kaplan 2016; Gilens 1999; Sears and Citrin 1985; Tesler 2012). The policies asked about on the 2018 CCES that meet this criterion are welfare, gun rights, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and taxes. Opinion on welfare, the ACA, and taxes is measured using single questions, while opinion on gun rights is tapped using a three-item battery.¹¹ The 2016 post-election NAAS contains two questions about affirmative action: one in the context of hiring and promotion and the other about university admissions. The second category is questions about general racial outlook. The 2018 CCES asks respondents to agree or disagree with two statements: “White people in the US have certain advantages because of the color of their skin” and “Racial problems in the US are rare,

isolated situations.” The 2016 post-election NAAS asks respondents to indicate how favorable they feel toward the Black Lives Matter movement and the Tea Party. The next two categories are about topics that are arguably less directly connected to race than the topics in the first two categories. The third category is vote choice. Both the 2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS asked respondents whom they voted for in the 2016 presidential election. Finally, the fourth category is questions about core non-racial political predispositions. The 2018 CCES asks about party identification and political ideology, while the 2016 post-election NAAS asks only about party identification. To aid comparability across all questions, all outcomes are coded 0–1 ranging from the most liberal response (0) to the most conservative response (1).

Findings

Nativity and other intra-Asian differences

I begin by testing the first hypothesis of whether racial resentment differs by nativity. Since one of the possible confounding factors is national origin, which was only asked about in the 2018 CCES, the analysis is conducted using data from that survey. Earlier, I theorized that racial resentment may be stronger among foreign-born than US-born Asians. To test this, I regress racial resentment on an indicator variable taking on a value of 1 if US-born and 0 if foreign-born. To this basic specification, I include additional variables to account for alternative explanations. These include, as just mentioned, national origin. Research suggests that Asian Americans who report being the victim of discrimination or a hate crime have a stronger sense of political commonality with other racial and ethnic groups (Wong et al. 2011), and so South Asians or Southeast Asians may exhibit less anti-Black prejudice due to having darker skin or experiencing post-September 11 racial profiling. Since national origin is theorized to matter at the regional level, it is measured using an indicator variable coded 1 for belonging to the following groups and 0 for not: East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), South Asian (Indian and Pakistani), and Southeast Asian (Filipino, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Hmong).¹² Other alternative factors accounted for are partisanship, income, and education, along with controls for the demographic variables of age, gender, and Southern residence.

Table 1 reports the OLS regression results. Model 1 estimates the relationship between nativity and racial resentment, while Model 2 examines whether the association holds up under a more stringent test accounting for alternative explanations and controls. The results indicate that US-born Asians are significantly less racially resentful than foreign-born Asians even after accounting for other factors, as predicted. Turning to alternative explanations, racial resentment somewhat surprisingly does not appear to vary by national origin, as Southeast and South Asians exhibit comparable levels to East Asians on average. Republican partisanship, not surprisingly, is strongly correlated with racial resentment. Also, education, age, and gender influence racial resentment, as better educated, younger, and female Asian Americans exhibit lower racial resentment scores. Models 3 and 4 report an additional test using 2016 post-election NAAS data. The multivariate models (Models 2 and 4) are the same except the dependent variable for Model 4 is the “distance from Blacks” measure described earlier.¹³ Among the

Table 1. (OLS) Predictors of racial attitudes among Asian Americans (2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS).

	2018 CCES (DV = racial resentment)		2016 post-election NAAS (DV = distance from Blacks)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
US-born	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Southeast Asian		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.05*** (0.01)
South Asian		0.00 (0.02)		-0.03 [^] (0.01)
Partisanship		0.40*** (0.02)		0.11*** (0.02)
Income		0.03 (0.04)		0.03 (0.02)
Education		-0.06* (0.03)		-0.05* (0.02)
Age		0.00*** (0.00)		0.00*** (0.00)
Male		0.03* (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)
Southern residence		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.52*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.53*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.03)
Observations	1394	1020	4362	3619
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.29	0.01	0.03

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are racial resentment ranging from 0 (least resentful) to 1 (most resentful) for Models 1 and 2 and distance from Blacks ranging from 0 (a lot in common) to 1 (nothing at all in common) for Models 3 and 4. South Asian includes Indian and Pakistani. Southeast Asian includes Vietnamese, Filipino, Cambodian, and Hmong. Omitted category is East Asian, consisting of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. All independent variables range from 0 to 1 except age, which is age in years. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$, [^] $p < .1$, two-tailed tests.

alternative explanations in Model 4, the results differ somewhat from the CCES model. Here, national origin matters, as Southeast and South Asians perceive less distance from Blacks than East Asians.¹⁴ Results for partisanship, education, and age replicate the CCES findings, while gender does not appear to matter in the NAAS model. But the most important finding with respect to our hypothesis is that nativity plays an important role in shaping Asian Americans' racial attitudes even after accounting for other factors, just as it did in the CCES data. This lends reassurance that anti-Black sentiment reliably differs by nativity.

The significance of nativity in this analysis, however, does not fully address whether lower levels of anti-Black animus are due to a more racially tolerant information environment as theorized earlier. Nativity is only a proxy for the influence of American schools and higher levels of social interaction with diverse peers. If the theory is correct, then we would expect foreign-born Asian Americans who were educated in the US to exhibit less anti-Black prejudice than foreign-born Asian Americans who were educated outside the US. We might also expect the duration of stay in the US among the foreign-born to be negatively correlated with anti-Black prejudice, as socialization in the US should lead to foreign-born Asians harboring less anti-Black prejudice than foreign-born Asians who arrived recently.

Fortunately, the 2016 NAAS has questions about the place of education and arrival in the US that allow for more direct tests of the influence of socialization. Foreign-born respondents are asked, "Did you complete all of your education in the United States?" Among foreign-born Asians who answered "yes" to this question ($n = 785$), the mean "distance from Blacks" score was 0.47 compared to 0.55 for foreign-born Asians who received at least some of their education outside of the United States ($n = 2483$) ($p < .01$). This difference remains statistically significant when controlling for all of the factors included in Table 1 (see Appendix Table 7, Models 1 and 2). Interestingly, US-born Asians' mean "distance from Blacks" score was 0.46 – a difference that is statistically

indistinguishable from the US-educated foreign-born average of 0.47 ($p = .62$). Meanwhile, the 2016 NAAS asks foreign-born respondents when they first came to live in the US. From this, the percentage of a respondent's life lived in the US can be determined by calculating $1 - (\text{age at arrival}/\text{age in 2016})$.¹⁵ This measure should be negatively correlated with the “distance from Blacks” score, and it is, even when controlling for the factors listed in Table 1 (see Appendix Table 7, Models 3–4). These findings suggest that socialization in American schools and American society, in general, is associated with lower levels of anti-Black prejudice.

Comparison to other racial groups

Next, I compare mean racial resentment levels between US-born and foreign-born Asian Americans and other racial groups. Figure 1 shows the mean racial resentment score by group for all respondents in the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018 CCES surveys. The mean racial resentment score for US-born Asians is right at the midpoint of the scale, 0.50, while the mean score for foreign-born Asians is slightly on the conservative side of the scale at 0.57. This difference is statistically significant ($p < .01$). When viewed in comparison to the other groups, however, Asian Americans' attitudes toward African Americans do not appear to be especially negative. For instance, both US-born and foreign-born Asians exhibited significantly lower levels of racial resentment than whites, whose mean score was 0.64 ($p < .01$ for both comparisons). The mean score for Latinos was 0.56, which is indistinguishable from foreign-born Asians ($p = .37$) and more conservative than US-born Asians ($p < .01$).¹⁶ Finally, the mean Black racial resentment score was 0.34, which is significantly more liberal than both Asian groups ($p < .01$ for both comparisons). In sum, the general pattern displayed in Figure 1 is consistent with other investigations of prejudice across racial groups (e.g., Krupnikov and Piston 2016; Lee 2000; Tesler and Sears 2010), which finds whites and Blacks at opposing ends of the racial resentment spectrum, with US-born Asians, foreign-born Asians, and Latinos falling somewhere in between.

Variation over time

Next, I turn to the question of how racial resentment levels have changed over time. Earlier, I hypothesized that US-born Asians' attitudes toward Blacks would shift in a liberal direction over time more quickly than the attitudes of foreign-born Asians. Figure 2 shows the mean racial resentment score for US-born and foreign-born Asians in the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018 CCES. For comparison, I also include the mean racial resentment score for white Republicans and white Democrats in those surveys. The most striking pattern observed in Figure 2 is two sets of nearly parallel lines: US-born Asians and white Democrats, who both trend sharply in a liberal direction between 2014 and 2018, and foreign-born Asians and white Republicans, whose trend appears to be less sharp.¹⁷

For a more rigorous test of whether US-born Asians are trending racially liberal at a faster rate than foreign-born Asians, I estimate a simple model that predicts racial resentment as a function of a dummy variable indicating US-born, the year (recoded to the 0–1 interval so that the earliest year, 2010, corresponds to 0 and the latest year, 2018,




Figure 1. Racial resentment by race and ethnicity (CCES 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

corresponds to 1), and an interaction term between the US-born dummy variable and the year. If the slopes for US-born and foreign-born Asians differ, we would expect a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term. The result in the first column of [Table 2](#) shows exactly that. For another test, I conduct a similar analysis using the 2008 and 2016 post-election NAAS. The distance from Blacks measure is regressed on a dummy variable indicating US-born, the year (0 = 2008 and 1 = 2016), and the interaction of US-born and year. The coefficient on the interaction term in the second column of [Table 2](#) is negative and marginally significant ($p = 0.06$), in line with results from the CCES data.¹⁸ In sum, it appears that US-born Asians' attitudes toward Blacks are shifting in a liberal direction faster than the attitudes of foreign-born Asians, mirroring trends seen among whites, particularly white Democrats.

Association between racial attitudes and broader political outlook

Next, I assess whether the relationship between anti-Black affect and political attitudes is stronger among the US-born. I begin by examining the first two categories of outcomes: racial policy preferences and general racial outlook. The 2018 CCES asks questions about welfare, gun rights, the ACA, taxes, whether whites have advantages, and whether racial

Racial Resentment by Group, 2010-2018 (CCES)




Figure 2. Time trend of mean racial resentment scores by group, 2010–2018 (CCES).

problems are rare, while the 2016 post-election NAAS asks about affirmative action in employment and college admissions as well as attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter movement and the Tea Party.¹⁹ To test for generational differences, I estimate models regressing issue opinion on racial attitudes, a dummy variable indicating US-born, and

Table 2. (OLS) US- and foreign-born Asian Americans’ racial attitudes over time.

	2010–2018 CCES (DV = racial resentment)	2008 NAAS and 2016 post-election NAAS (DV = distance from Blacks)
US-born	–0.00 (0.02)	–0.04** (0.01)
Year (coded 0–1)	–0.09*** (0.02)	–0.05*** (0.01)
US-born x Year	–0.11*** (0.02)	–0.03^ (0.02)
Constant	0.62*** (0.01)	0.58*** (0.00)
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.01
N	3708	9521

Note: Asian American respondents only. Dependent variables are racial resentment ranging from 0 (least resentful) to 1 (most resentful) for CCES and distance from Blacks ranging from 0 (a lot in common) to 1 (nothing at all in common) for NAAS. All independent variables range from 0 to 1. ****p* < .001, ***p* < .01, ^ < .1, two-tailed tests.

the interaction between the two variables. All models also include controls for income, education, gender, age, and Southern residence.

The results are presented in [Table 3](#). Entries in the first row represent the effect of racial animus on issue opinion among the foreign-born. For every question, racial animus is a statistically significant predictor of opinion. This suggests that despite being newer to American political culture, foreign-born Asians still bring their racial attitudes to bear on their political views. Entries in the second row represent the difference in opinion between US-born Asians and foreign-born Asians with very low levels of racial animus. The effects are negative in all but one case and are statistically significant in a few. This means that racially liberal US-born Asians tend to be more liberal on these questions than racially liberal foreign-born Asians. The most important row for our hypothesis, however, is the third row displaying the interaction coefficients. Here, we see that the difference in the outcome variable between the least and most racially conservative US-born Asian is significantly greater than the same difference among foreign-born Asians (shown in row 1) in all but one instance. In other words, the views of the US-born are even more strongly racialized than the already-racialized views of the foreign-born, lending support to our hypothesis.²⁰

Does this same pattern hold for opinions that are arguably less inherently racial than the racially inflected questions examined in [Table 3](#)? To test this, I turn to the final two categories of outcomes: vote choice and non-racial predispositions. The 2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS both ask about vote choice in the 2016 presidential election and party identification, while the 2018 CCES also asks about political ideology. The results of regressing these outcomes on the same model of racial attitudes, nativity, the interaction of the two, and controls are shown in [Table 4](#).

The results in the third row indicate that the heightened connection between US-born Asians' racial attitudes and political attitudes does not fade away even when examining these outcomes. The CCES and NAAS analyses both show that the slope shift between US-born and foreign-born Asians is statistically significant for voting for Donald Trump in 2016 (columns 1 and 4). This is perhaps not surprising given that vote choice in 2016 was even more racially charged than it was in the two elections in which Obama ran (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018).

On party identification (columns 2 and 5), both analyses find positive interaction effects, although it is only significant in the NAAS data. On political ideology (column 3), the CCES interaction coefficient is positive and statistically significant. In sum, we see support for the hypothesis that vote choice and non-racial predispositions are more strongly racialized for US-born Asians in four out of the five estimated models.²¹

Finally, I conduct one further analysis to address an important question that the analysis in this section does not resolve: among US-born Asians, who is creating the racial polarization indicated by the positive interaction coefficients? One possibility is that it is the racially liberal who are especially likely to have liberal policy attitudes, behaviors, and orientations. Or it could be the opposite – that it is the racially conservative who are more likely to have conservative views. Or a third possibility is that both could be contributing to the polarization. To better understand the relationship between racial attitudes and outcome measures across the racial attitudes spectrum among the US-born, [Figures 3](#) and [4](#) show predicted values of the outcome measures at every point on the racial attitudes scale holding the control variables at their mean scores for the questions in [Tables 3](#) and [4](#) that had significant interaction coefficients. The racialized issue

Table 3. Predictors of racialized policy preferences and general racial outlook (2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS).

	2018 CCES						2016 post-election NAAS			
	Decrease Welfare Spending (OLS)	Gun Rights (OLS)	Repeal ACA (logistic)	No State Income Taxes (logistic)	Disagree – Whites Have Advantages (OLS)	Racial Problems Rare (OLS)	Oppose Affirmative Action in Employment (OLS)	Oppose Affirmative Action in Education (OLS)	Unfavorable to Black Lives Matter (OLS)	Favorable to Tea Party (OLS)
Racial attitudes	0.37*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	3.19*** (0.39)	0.92** (0.32)	0.50*** (0.04)	0.40*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03 [^] (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)
US-born	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.06)	−1.75** (0.60)	−0.77 (0.49)	−0.00 (0.06)	−0.11 [^] (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.10 [^] (0.05)	−0.20*** (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Racial attitudes x US-born	0.10* (0.05)	0.09 [^] (0.05)	0.95 [^] (0.57)	1.64*** (0.45)	−0.01 (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
Constant	0.07 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	−1.70*** (0.40)	−0.38 (0.36)	0.07 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ² / Percentage correctly predicted	0.23	0.12	73.2	61.4	0.26	0.22	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.06
N	1392	1382	1391	1393	1390	1354	4175	4056	4175	4175

Note: Entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression coefficients as noted. Racial attitudes are measured using racial resentment for the 2018 CCES data or perceived distance from Blacks for the 2016 post-election NAAS. Both variables range from 0 (most racially liberal response) to 1 (most racially conservative response). All dependent and independent variables range from 0 to 1. Models include controls for income, education, gender, age, and Southern residence. For full regression results, see Appendix Table 12. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, [^] $p < .1$, two-tailed tests.

Table 4. Predictors of 2016 Vote Choice, Party Identification, and Ideology (2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS).

	2018 CCES			2016 post-election NAAS	
	2016 – voted for Trump (logistic)	Republican (OLS)	Conservative (OLS)	2016 – voted for Trump (logistic)	Republican (OLS)
Racial attitudes	4.65 [^] (2.49)	0.41** (0.12)	0.32*** (0.09)	1.32 [^] (0.67)	0.03 (0.06)
US-born	-1.46* (0.62)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.52* (0.24)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Racial attitudes × US-born	2.47* (1.00)	0.06 (0.06)	0.09* (0.04)	0.78* (0.38)	0.09* (0.04)
Constant	-3.04* (1.52)	0.15* (0.07)	0.19*** (0.05)	-3.09*** (0.43)	0.30*** (0.04)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R ² /Percentage correctly predicted	82.5	0.23	0.29	76.7	0.06
N	782	1334	1388	2475	3885

Note: Entries are ordinary least squares or logistic regression coefficients as noted. Racial attitudes are measured using racial resentment for the 2018 CCES data or perceived distance from Blacks for the 2016 post-election NAAS. Both variables range from 0 (most racially liberal response) to 1 (most racially conservative response). All dependent and independent variables range from 0 to 1. Models include controls for income, education, gender, age, and Southern residence. For full regression results, see Appendix Table 13. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, [^] $p < .1$, two-tailed tests.

preferences and general racial outlook questions are shown in [Figure 3](#), while vote choice and non-racial political predispositions are shown in [Figure 4](#).

At first glance, there does not appear to be a clear pattern supporting one of the three possibilities. In an effort to discern patterns across the 13 questions shown in [Figures 3](#) and [4](#), I consider an effect to be driven by racial liberals if the predicted rating for the most racially liberal US-born Asian is significantly more liberal than the predicted rating for the most racially liberal foreign-born Asian. For instance, the racial polarization seen in the “no state income taxes” measure in the center-left panel of [Figure 3](#) would be considered driven by racial liberals since the predicted rating on the outcome measure for the most racially sympathetic US-born Asian is 0.23 more liberal on the 0–1 opinion scale than the most racially sympathetic foreign-born Asian, a statistically distinguishable difference as indicated by the non-overlapping confidence intervals. Conversely, I consider an effect to be driven by racial conservatives if the predicted rating of the most racially conservative US-born Asian is significantly more conservative than the predicted rating of the most racially conservative foreign-born Asian. The welfare measure would be considered driven by racially conservative US-born Asians, as the most racially conservative US-born Asian is projected to be significantly more conservative (by 0.11 on the 0–1 welfare opinion scale) than the most racially conservative foreign-born Asian.²²

Across the 13 panels of [Figures 3](#) and [4](#), nine meet the criteria of being due to racially liberal US-born Asians being especially liberal, while only one is driven by racially conservative US-born Asians being especially conservative. Thus, it appears that most of the larger influence of anti-Black animus on US-born Asians’ views is due to the unique liberalism of racially liberal US-born Asians.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to shed light on the nature and political significance of anti-Black prejudice among Asian Americans. First, I find that nativity shapes racial attitudes among Asian Americans even after accounting for alternative influences, as US-




Figure 3. Predicted racialized issue positions and general racial outlook as a function of racial attitudes. Based on the analysis presented in Table 3. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Data from 2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS.

born Asians are more racially liberal than foreign-born Asians. In turn, both groups are more racially liberal than whites. Second, I find that US-born Asians’ racial attitudes have liberalized at a faster rate than foreign-born Asians’ racial attitudes, mirroring the rate of change among white Democrats. Finally, on the question of political relevance, I find that while racial attitudes are a potent force in shaping the political views of foreign-born Asians, they are even more tightly interconnected with the political views of US-born Asians. This racialization among the US-born appears to be the result of racially liberal US-born Asians being especially likely to have liberal attitudes.

These findings have implications for the future of American politics as Asian Americans become a larger share of the American electorate. One interpretation of the results is that racial animosity is less widespread among the US-born, and so the prevalence of




Figure 4. Predicted vote choice and non-racial political predispositions as a function of racial attitudes. Based on the analysis presented in Table 4. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Data from 2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS.

racial animosity may go down the longer Asian Americans remain in the United States. On the other hand, anti-Black sentiment is an even more critical influence on the politics of the US-born. Thus, the hope that growing racial diversity would bring about a less racialized politics seems overly optimistic. I noted earlier that competition among minority groups for political, economic, and cultural power is likely to become a more prominent feature of American politics in the coming years. The findings suggest that there is a strong link between anti-Black prejudice and Asian American political views and that such linkages are likely to factor into the calculations of politicians and other opinion

leaders looking to benefit from stoking resentment of (or evoking sympathy for) African Americans.

The findings also speak to longstanding academic debates on the incorporation of immigrants into American society. Canonical assimilation theory suggests that immigrant groups generally come to resemble the native-born majority and lose their ethnic distinctiveness the longer they reside in the United States (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). Asian Americans are sometimes thought of as the “model minority,” a paradigmatic example of a group whose high socioeconomic attainment and presence in mainstream institutions has blurred boundaries between themselves and the native-born white majority (Nee and Holbrow 2013). The picture that emerges from the findings in this article complicates the notion that today’s United States has a single mainstream culture that Asian Americans are assimilating into. Today, America is deeply divided along partisan and cultural lines (Mason 2018). That division also exists on issues of race (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Tesler 2016). Instead of integrating into a single mainstream culture, Asian Americans born and socialized in the United States may align themselves with one of two distinct worldviews: cosmopolitanism or ethno-traditional nationalism (Kaufmann 2019). At present, it appears that most US-born Asians adopt a more racially sympathetic worldview, although some adopt political attitudes grounded in hostility toward Blacks. The social and economic factors that shape which America US-born Asian Americans (and other immigrant-based groups) integrate into is a question raised by these findings that awaits future research. The balance of power in American politics may hinge on the answer.

Of course, it is impossible to know exactly what the future will hold. But one clear conclusion to draw from this article is that future work on Asian American political behavior should take racial attitudes into account. Just as they have been shown to be for white Americans, these attitudes are a powerful force in shaping Asian American opinion.

Notes

1. The media attention given to examples of intergroup conflict should not overshadow examples of Asian Americans forming cross-racial coalitions with other racial minorities around issues such as immigration, workers’ rights, civil rights, redistricting, and electing candidates of color (Lien 2001). However, prior research on cross-racial coalition building focuses on relations among community leaders. Less is known about intergroup relations at the mass level.
2. Critics argue that racial resentment does not persuasively separate racial prejudice from non-racial political conservatism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Although this claim has been challenged (Sears and Henry 2005; Tarman and Sears 2005), I include an alternative measure of anti-Black prejudice in the empirical analysis.
3. To be sure, the claim here is not that U.S.-born Asians are socialized in a racially egalitarian way. For instance, they, like all Americans, are exposed to negative media depictions of African Americans during childhood and adolescence (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999).
4. Research on the liberalization of white racial attitudes after 2016 has not identified a clear cause of the trend, though researchers speculate that contributing factors include President Trump’s attacks against racial groups, the use of social media to record and publicize racial

violence, and the increasingly explicit rhetoric of Democratic elites highlighting systemic racism (Edsall 2019; Yglesias 2019).

5. See Table 1 in the Appendix for summary statistics for U.S.-born and foreign-born Asians for all variables used in this study.
6. Since the ACS does not measure religious affiliation or partisanship, data from the 2012 Pew Asian American Survey and the 2016 National Asian American Survey are used to estimate religious affiliation and partisanship in the Asian American adult population, respectively.
7. This variable is coded 0 = a lot, .25 = some, .5 = don't know/refused, .75 = little, and 1 = nothing.
8. The other two statements in the racial resentment battery are, "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve," and "It's really a matter of not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." The five potential responses to each statement are strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree.
9. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the Pearson's correlation coefficients between each pair of racial resentment questions on the 2018 CCES for Asian Americans and whites. Since the 2010–2014 CCES only contains two racial resentment items, the correlation between the two items is reported in the paper.
10. Factor loadings are stronger for whites on the "Slavery and discrimination" and "Blacks gotten less than deserved" items and similar between the two groups on the "Blacks should work their way up" and "Blacks need only try harder" items. See Appendix Table 4 for the full results. Since three is generally considered the minimum number of items for a one-factor CFA (Brown 2006), I do not conduct a CFA for the two-item 2010–2014 racial resentment battery.
11. Question wording and coding for all items can be found in the Appendix.
12. In an effort to preserve as much comparability across the two surveys as possible, ethnic groups who were interviewed in either the 2018 CCES or the 2016 post-election NAAS but not both surveys are dropped from the analysis. This includes Taiwanese, Thai, and a residual category of "other" Asians in the 2018 CCES and Bangladeshis in the 2016 post-election NAAS. Including those respondents does not affect the conclusion that U.S.-born Asians exhibit less racial resentment than foreign-born Asians. Sample sizes for each group in the 2018 CCES were Chinese ($n = 366$), Indian ($n = 246$), Filipino ($n = 212$), Japanese ($n = 164$), Vietnamese ($n = 142$), Korean ($n = 133$), Pakistani ($n = 39$), Cambodian ($n = 13$), and Hmong ($n = 13$). Sample sizes for each group in the 2016 post-election NAAS were Vietnamese ($n = 501$), Japanese ($n = 500$), Indian ($n = 500$), Korean ($n = 498$), Filipino ($n = 498$), Chinese ($n = 474$), Cambodian ($n = 400$), Hmong ($n = 350$), and Pakistani ($n = 320$).
13. All analyses using the "distance from Blacks" measure as the dependent variable are replicated using a logit model in which the dependent variable is specified as ordinal instead of continuous. Results regarding the influence of nativity are robust to this alternative specification and are reported in Appendix Tables 5 and 8.
14. I also conduct an alternative test in which each ethnic group is represented with its own dummy variable (with Chinese serving as the comparison group). As displayed in Appendix Table 6, the results show that Vietnamese and Korean Americans score lower on anti-Black sentiment compared to Chinese Americans on both the 2018 CCES and 2016 post-election NAAS. In both surveys, the inclusion of ethnic-specific controls does not affect the difference in anti-Black sentiment between U.S.-born and foreign-born Asian Americans.
15. For instance, a 50-year-old respondent in 2016, who first came to the U.S. at the age of 10, has spent $1 - (10/50)$ or 0.80 of her life in the U.S (that is, 40 out of the 50 years).
16. Although exploring intra-group variation in Latino prejudice is beyond the scope of this paper, other work demonstrates considerable heterogeneity in Latino attitudes toward African Americans (Jones-Correa 2011; McClain et al. 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003; Wilkinson 2015)

17. All differences between white Republicans and foreign-born Asians are statistically significant, as are all differences between white Democrats and U.S.-born Asians ($p < .01$ for all comparisons). Differences between foreign-born and U.S.-born Asians are statistically significant in 2010 ($p = .03$), marginally significant in 2012 ($p = .08$), not significant in 2014 ($p = .48$), and significant in 2018 ($p < .01$).
18. The coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant ($p = .04$) in an alternative model in which the “distance from Blacks” dependent variable is specified as ordinal instead of continuous. See Appendix Table 8.
19. The NAAS randomly assigned respondents to three versions of the affirmative action in employment question, four versions of the affirmative action in education question, and two versions of the Tea Party question. See the Appendix for question wording. Since it is difficult to determine which version has the strongest face validity, responses are combined into a single measure. See Appendix Tables 9–11 for regression results predicting each version separately.
20. See Appendix Table 12 for full regression results including the coefficients on the control variables.
21. For full regression results, see Appendix Table 13. For results of models without controls, see Appendix Tables 14 and 15.
22. It is theoretically possible for the racialization of an issue to be due to U.S.-born Asians at both ends of the racial resentment spectrum being closer to the extreme ends of the outcome measure than foreign-born Asians, but none of the outcomes shown in Figures 3 and 4 reflect this pattern.

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